Dear Editor,

Microvote Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines with Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) lack the security provided by Hand-Marked paper ballots currently in use in Brown County. Paper ballots can be verified and recounted independent of software. With DRE VVPAT, there is no process to verify counts independent of software.

Plans and cost estimates for switching to Microvote VVPAT appear not to include key variables, including reliability and practicality of the proposed units. In fact the proposed units currently exceed standard voting machine life expectancy.

The vast majority of the United States uses hand-marked paper ballots and this trend is on the rise. A small percentage of the U.S. uses the DRE VVPAT voting machines like Microvote.

Vote Centers offer a potential cost savings, as well as benefit to voters that should be explored. Attempting to also change the voting equipment at the same time is problematic and could result in a negative perception of vote centers.

Brown County Government representatives are asked to give serious consideration to public interests and security concerns before changing the current, proven election systems. Voter trust in elections is a foundation to a strong democracy.

Future meetings on election systems should facilitate public participation, with timely notice, scheduling after work hours when the public is available and information available on the Brown County Government Calendar and Website.

The Brown County Election Board is appreciated for providing a meeting Nov. 14 to allow the public to preview Microvote Election Equipment currently in consideration.

The purpose of this communication is to address issues raised in the meeting, and to provide additional information for consideration.

In selecting voting equipment, it’s beneficial to consider options and to be aware of what is being used elsewhere, throughout the country. Nationwide, more than two thirds of the United States use the voting systems Brown County uses – hand-marked paper ballots supplemented with Ballot Marking Devices (BMD) that provide assistive features for accessibility. Hand-marked paper ballot usage has increased 30.5 percent since 2012 across the states. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines, like the Microvote electronic machines, with VVPAT, represent only 3.6 percent of Election Day voting in the United States.

Longevity and reliability are also important considerations. The life expectancy of Voting machines is considered to be 10 years up to a maximum 20 years. The Microvote DRE machines will be 20 years old at the time of the 2024 election. Older equipment is known to be a higher security risk, more susceptible to break-downs and harder to get replacement parts. Serious consideration is warranted before deciding to spend money on VVPAT printers for use with potentially obsolete equipment – even if a grant can be obtained to cover the costs of printers.

In the public meeting, concerns were expressed about security of the paper ballot system. These included the potential to substitute or add quantities of forged ballots to change the election results.

There are many safeguards in place to prevent this type of fraud. These include:

• · Tight control and monitoring of paper ballots at every step. Official ballots are kept in a locked, secure location with limited, controlled access. Ballot counts must be tracked and recorded as they are distributed for use (e.g. absentee mail in ballots, allocation to each poll location).
• · Every ballot, before it is given to a voter, requires two sets of initials: a Republican and a Democrat. Only designated individuals are authorized to initial ballots.
• · Initialed ballots are tracked and accounted for by assigning every ballot to a voter upon issue.

o In the 2020 election, initials were discovered on mail in absentee ballots that did not match authorized personnel. The forged initials were discovered by the Brown County Election board among mail in absentee ballots. After discovery, all mail in ballots were inspected and all forgeries were identified. In this case, even though the initials were forged, the ballots were properly assigned to individual voters, and zero vote fraud was identified.

• · On Election Day, the number of votes tabulated in each optical scanner is compared with the number of voters who checked in via the electronic poll book, and matched with the number of ballots issued. Discrepancies are required to be investigated and resolved, including any spoiled ballots, or other anomaly.
• · Each voter inserts their own ballot into the scanner as soon as they have voted.
• · At the end of the Election Day, the vote totals are printed from each optical scanner at each poll. Each official tape total is initialed by election workers. Multiple copies of the tapes are printed and dispersed as needed to the Clerk and Election Board, to the media, party representatives, candidate representatives, etc.
• · Finally, ballots are removed from the optical scanner locked ballot box, and inserted into bags which are locked and secured by bipartisan election workers together. Bags are sealed to prevent tampering, prepared for secure transport and documented chain of custody.

In summary, no individual(s), would be able to obtain and mark a significant number of ballots to switch with or add to the official ballots to impact the vote total.

Our current voting system offers the ability to verify the vote through access to the original hand marked paper ballots. With the proposed Microvote VVPAT units, vote tallies cannot be verified independent of the software itself, providing no back up in case of concerns of machine error or hacking.

If the County, after due diligence assessing true and total costs, ends up selecting electronic voting machines in lieu of hand-marked paper ballots, let’s make sure that this decision is based on accurate information about costs and security risks of both hand marked paper ballots and electronic machines.

Another issue raised regarding the security of hand-marked paper ballots was raised in regard to accounting for ballots after the election. In the 2022 Brown County total recount for District 62, 17 ballots could not be located. While 17 ballots was not sufficient to affect the outcome of the race, it does highlight the importance of securely accounting for the ballots returned from precincts. Secure tracking and accounting is required regardless of the election system used. It will be required for the voting machines, tabulators or VVPAT printers, VVPAT printouts or paper ballots, mail in ballots and all election materials and supplies.

Moving to Vote Centers might be a wonderful opportunity to develop sustainable savings for the county elections. Vote Centers have potential benefits to voters as well. However, changing to Microvote VVPAT equipment at the same time may negatively impact the success of vote centers. Too many changes at once create failures.

The processes and personnel requirements for Microvote VVPAT machines need to be further defined. In the demonstration, the vendor described the Microvote voting process as:

• · Every voter, when they check in to vote will either receive a card programmed to insert into the voting machine, or they will receive a printed paper receipt with their voter identification and precinct.
• · An election worker must stand by the equipment to either use their administrative card to set up the ballot for the voter’s precinct based on the voter’s printout, or they will guide the voter to insert the card received at check in to set up their ballot.
• · The election worker must clear the machine before and after each voter.
• · A process will need to be developed for handling/collecting the cards for re-programming and re-use and/or to collect and store the paper print outs.

In event of a recount or audit, how would this be conducted? The vendor indicated:

• · One method involves simply re-running the vote tallies stored on the machine.
• · One method requires a separate machine that is used to roll through the VVPAT, to view each ballot, one at a time, for a recount – for each machine. The cost of these devices isn’t clear. The time and personnel required for such an endeavor also warrant consideration.
• · Both of these methods fail to provide any means of recounting/confirming votes that is not dependent on software. Software prints the VVPAT. Software records the votes stored in the unit.

There are many unanswered questions regarding security, reliability, recounts, total cost, supplies, personnel, process, storage, upkeep, etc. with the Microvote machines.

A commitment was made to provide another public meeting to allow more Brown County Voters to assess the machines, ask questions and provide comment. Requests have been made to schedule the meeting when the ‘9-5’ working public can attend, to provide sufficient notice to allow voters to plan attendance, to publicize the meeting and to post time and date on the public government website calendar.

There may or may not be a potential cost savings in the short term with Microvote VVPAT. But considering remaining unanswered questions about cost, procedures, personnel, recount capabilities, security and mechanical reliability concerns of outdated equipment, additional information is needed before a decision.

It is requested that the County Government representatives and County Election Board recognize that election system changes would impact every single household in the county. Elections are the foundation of our democracy and voter trust in the system warrants serious respect and consideration prior to implementation of change.

Thank you for your consideration to this important matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Shari Frank

President, LWV Brown County